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Abstract 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)’s quest for the membership of the European Union has lingered for the past 
14 years with little promise of success. The main reason for this predicament has often been attributed to 
the chronic ethnic politics characteristics of the Bosnian country. This paper, however, takes a different 
view of the problem by bringing into focus the EU’s contribution to it. Four facets of the EU shortcomings   
were examined to prove this point, namely (1) The problem with the EU's Special Representative; (2) 
The problem with the EU's Stabilisation and Association Agreement in Bosnia; (3) The disunity 
of the European Union position  on Bosnia; and (4)The failure of ‘Dayton II’. The paper concludes 
that the four areas of weakness point to the reality of a serious credibility crisis resulting from the 
capability-expectations gap on the part of  the EU , a situation that had since  rendered the EU ineffective in 
helping Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to overcome its intricate domestic challenges and to bring it closer 
to its membership of the EU. 
 
Keywords: capability-expectations gap, constitutional reforms, credibility crisis, Europeanisation, 
European union, ethnic politics  
 
 
Without integrating the Western Balkans, Europe will struggle to manage its out-of-area 
expansion and its global commitments as problems from the region will keep its focus on local 
issues (Antonio Milososki)  
 
Introduction 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the European Union have been in close economic and 
political relations for more than a decade now.  In the aftermath of the war in Bosnia which ended 
in December 1995 the European Union has intensified its strategic activities towards the western 
Balkans region including Bosnia. The end of the war saw the shift in the EU governance towards 
the western Balkans in general and BiH in particular. One after another the EU proposed  
initiatives that were supposed to strengthen the European perspective of BiH (Hadzikadunic, 
2005: 51).  
The first such initiative came from France during its EU presidency in December 1996 within 
the framework of the so-called Royaumont Process. The initiative’s main objective was the 
stabilization and peace-building in South-East Europe. The Royaumont Process was the first 
regional strategy towards the western Balkans. Then beginning in 1997 and adopting  a regional 
and more active and united approach, the EU launched a political and economic conditionality for 
the development of bilateral relations   through the PHARE and OBNOVA humanitarian 
programmes whereby aspiring countries must  respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law (Juncos, 2005: 96).  
Later, in June 1998, the EU-BiH Consultative Task Force was established and tasked with the 
responsibility of  providing  technical and expert advice in the field of judiciary, education, 
media, administration, and economy. This signified the  BiH initial official move towards the EU 
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membership (Susko, 2009: 104). In addition,  the EU and BiH officials signed the “Declaration of 
Special Relations between EU and BiH”. Then in 1999 the EU initiated the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) establishing more concrete and tangible political and economic links 
with the regional countries. On 8 March 2000 the EU Commissioner Chris Patten announced the 
Road Map for BiH as the first step in the framework of SAP. The document identified 18 initial 
steps which had to be implemented and which could lead to a feasibility study for a SAA with the 
EU. A new European partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted by the Council on 18 
February 2008. Following a difficult and slow reform process Bosnian government signed a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU in June 2008, which was the first 
pre-accession tool towards the country’s EU membership (Vucheva, 2008). Since then little 
progress has been achieved. 
The slow progress of the BiH accession to the EU may be attributed to two categories of 
factors , namely the complex and intractable nature of the Bosnian ethnic political differences, 
and the relative incapability of the EU to help Bosnian domestic actors resolve those differences. 
Because relatively scant attention has hitherto been given to the EU factors, this paper seeks to 
elucidate the manner in which the EU limitations had contributed to the deadlock in the Bosnian  
Europeanisation process.  
 
 
The Europeanisation process  
 
The concept of Europeanisation has become very popular within the study of European 
integration. In fact, Europeanisation is a logical extension of the EU integration theory. It gained 
special popularity among academia during the 1990s and beyond (Ladrech, 1994; Borzel and 
Risse, 2003). There has been a variety of definitions made in relation to Europeanization. 
However, most of them interpret this process as reform process in domestic political and 
economic system affected by policies decided at the European level. That is, we can define 
Europeanization as some form of domestic change that is caused by European decision-making. 
Similarly, Radaelli defines Europeanization as a “processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and 
(c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of 
doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making 
of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political 
structures and public policies” (2000).  
However, very often it happens that European norms and values are in clash with the EU 
aspirant's values and norms. As Rory Domm argues “despite the rhetoric, Europeanisation, 
whereby vast numbers of detailed, non-negotiable rules are adopted by applicant countries, is 
hardly always consistent with local ownership (2011: 58). Therefore, it is crucial that the EU find 
the way and develop solid methods as to how to diffuse and transmit its rules, policies, values and 
a European paradigm as an overall concept.  
Europeanization process may have two functions. First, it explains the influence of the 
European politics and institutions on the domestic politics. Second, Europeanization stresses the 
process of change through which domestic actors adapt to European integration (Figure 1.1). As 
reflected in the paradigm  European integration leads to pressures for the aspiring country to 
make necessary adjustments the success of which rests on the interplay of domestic factors (Risse 
et al. 2001: 6-12).  Europeanization thus  has critical transformative power for  the member 
countries and therefore is of crucial importance. This pressure is a function of the degree of fit (or 
misfit) and congruence (or incongruence) between “Europe” and the aspiring countries’ domestic 
performance (Caporaso, 2008: 29). The  degree of fit or misfit leads to adaptational pressures.  If 
the EU policies and  standards are similar to those within the  aspiring countries then the pressure 
for reform is much lower.  Granted that such a pressure may be necessary and therefore desirable, 
it is , alas,  not  sufficient a condition  for reforms to be spearheaded by domestic actors (Borzel 
and Risse, 2003: 58). 
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Source: Risse et al. (2001: 6), in Cowles et al., p. 1-20. 
 
Figure 1. Europeanization and domestic change 
 
 
The Bosnian Europeanization process and the EU credibility crisis 
 
There is a need to recognise that there is the so-called “capability–expectations gap” (Hill, 1993: 
315) - between what the EU has been talking to be doing and what it is actually able to deliver in 
practice. the capability–expectations gap has resulted from three closely related factors: namely, 
the ability to agree on foreign policy goals, resource availability, and the instruments at the EU's 
disposal which all rendered the EU mission  clouded in ambiguity (Toje, 2008: 124). In the 
Bosnian case it is imperative  that the EU proves that it is capable of confronting the Bosnian 
malaise effectively instead of just placing the blame on the inflammatory rhetoric of  the BiH 
ethno-nationalist political for the deadlock. 
 In fact, eighty-eight percent of Bosnians support Bosnia's European ambitions, according to 
the poll conducted by the Bosnian agency for European integration for which 1,200 people were 
questioned (Eubusiness, 2011). Furthermore,the poll results show that support for EU 
membership is strongest in Bosnia's Muslim (Bosniak) community with 97 percent in favor, 
while 85 percent of Bosnian Croats support it and 78 percent of Bosnian Serbs (Kotonika, 2011). 
Such a significant number of proponents for EU integration among the citizens of all the three 
ethnic groups is an opportunity for the EU to prove its institutional capabilities.  
 
The problem with the EU's special representative 
The EU has established certain instruments  to speed up Bosnia’s membership. One such 
instrument is the  European Union Special Representative in BiH (EUSR) who also acts  as a 
High Representative . In March 2001 Lord Paddy Ashdown was named  the first EUSR in BiH.  
The main and the most important duty of EUSR has been to help the BiH government in 
making the EU reforms. The mandate of the EUSR is to promote the overall political 
coordination and offer the EU advice and facilitation to BiH to help the country meet necessary 
requirements for the EU membership (EC, 2009: 8) in line with the European Union’s policy 
objectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These include, in particular, helping achieve progress in 
implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement as well as in the Stabilisation and Association 
Process, the process by which BiH moves towards the European Union (EUSRBiH, 2011). In 
addition, the EUSR regularly reports to the Council of the European Union, the inter-
governmental body representing the 27 EU member states, through the High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council.  
Thus, the EUSR has been of crucial importance in putting pressure on domestic political 
leaders to continue with the EU-related reform process. However, due to the vague position of the 
EU on the Bosnian crisis the EUSR could not play his role effectively.  
For instance, very often there has been serious imposition of reform process from the 
HR/EUSR on local politicians. Probably this was clearest during recent police reform. The 
Commission Feasibility Study published in November 2003 identified weaknesses in the policing 
system in BiH and concluded that it is necessary to “proceed with structural police reforms with a 
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view to rationalizing police services” (2003: 26). As BiH political elites could not make 
compromise on the necessary reforms the EUSR imposed the reforms on them and thus solved 
the deadlock. This finally enabled the EC to recommend the start of the SAA negotiations with 
the BiH government on 21 October 2005. However, such an imposition was clear forced 
Europeanizing reform. Previous HR Petritsch summarized the situation by stressing: “I 
furthermore wanted to move this country away from a situation where it seemed, that 
fundamental changes – at times even alien to its local traditions – were being simply imposed on 
this state and its citizens. More often than not – the country was treated as object” (2006: 4).  
BiH future in the EU is thus highly uncertain and even problematic because of the 
underdeveloped domestic policy-making structures and serious marginalization of both political 
representatives and ordinary citizens from open democratic deliberation. That is, coerced 
Europeanization by the EUSR has hampered genuine democracy to flourish. Thus, the EU is 
implicitly paralysing active involvement in policy-making and political responsibility of the 
Bosnian politicians.  
In addition, much confusion surrounds the dual function of the HR/EUSR in BiH. Commenting 
on the appointment of Lord Ashdown as the EUSR the EUPM official claimed that  it was felt 
that “he was the right person for the job…but he never really was the EUSR...the EUSR position 
was essentially irrelevant” (Mustonen, 2007: 20). This was also the case when in January 2009, 
the international community’s High Representative (HR) and the EUSR in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) unexpectedly announced his resignation in order to take up the post of Slovak 
Foreign Minister instead. From his early mandate he knew very well that his position was like 
‘riding a dead horse’ as he used to say. Therefore, as Judy Batt points out, “the abrupt departure 
of HR/EUSR Lajcak has exposed drift and disarray in the EU’s policy towards BiH” (2009: 1). It 
would not be far from truth to infer that Lajcak did not have a clear-cut  support from Brussels 
which would help him to do his job effectively. As the International Crisis Group pointed out in 
its report, “There is some reluctance in Brussels for taking up such responsibilities, especially if it 
means deployment of the largest ever EUSR office, and increased EC funding (2007: 27). In 
short, the disunited position of the EU member states makes the role of the EUSR in BiH 
ineffective and highly irrelevant as the case of  Lajcak illustrates.   
 
The problem with the EU's stabilisation and association agreement in Bosnia 
The US’s  shift in its foreign policy of prioritizing other regions  than Bosnia has left a significant 
diplomatic space for other global powers such as the EU to assert its influence in this highly 
problematic country ( Hadzikadunic , 2005: 23). Although the Union developed new institutional 
relations with the regional countries through the newly initiated Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) it has faced a lot of challenges especially in Bosnia. The SAA includes 
provisions and measures for future EU membership of the western Balkan countries. In fact, SAA 
is similar to the Europe Agreements that the EU signed with the Central and Eastern European 
countries in the 1990s and to the Association Agreement with Turkey.  
However, given the long political malaise in Bosnia it is obvious that the “EU's carrot” in the 
form of the SAA has not worked well with the country’s local officials. As a pivotal agreement, 
the SAA has not generated enough momentum for reform process to take place in Bosnia. In fact,  
it should be re-examined in order to make it in line with the real needs of  the BiH people. The 
EU leaders seem  very often to be making the same mistake of ignoring the real problems of  
Bosnia because they  tend to believe that mere European integration process will automatically 
make the country democratic, stable and peaceful.  Hence the imposition of  the simplistic  
‘European values’ on the taken-for-granted but radically opposing ‘Bosnian values’. In other 
words, “The EU needs to rebuild its credibility in BiH by forging a unified position on a long-
term strategy for the country, actively engaging in the constitutional reform process and giving 
more effective support to the next EUSR” (Batt, 2009: 1). 
Indeed, not only had the SAA not generated the desired reform momentum, the Republika 
Srpska (RS) was busy unravelling some of the hard-won gains of the previous 13 years, including 
reforms required by the EU as preconditions for signing the SAA (Bassuener and Lyon , 2009: 2). 
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This made it even more urgent for  the EU to be able to come up with concrete values, norms, and 
standards that would be appealing to Bosnian politicians and citizens.  
If the EU has been short in its ‘carrot’ for the BiH  the EU sticks have also not been effective 
in influencing the Bosnian political elites. The EU has not developed adequate “stick policy” 
which could be applied to politicians, political parties, and organizations that support counter 
Europeanisation policies. Only recently has the EU foreign minister Lady Ashton demanded that 
her new Bosnian envoy, part of her newly created diplomatic service, be given new powers by the 
Council of EU foreign ministers to impose travel bans and asset freezes on obstructionist Bosnian 
politicians (Waterfield, 2010). 
 Even the EU financial aid for the country has not been  motivating enough for  domestic 
politicians to implement the necessary measures that Brussels had set beforehand. For instance, 
the EU provides targeted assistance to potential candidate countries through its IPA (Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance) mechanism which supersedes the previous  five pre-accession 
instruments of the  Phare, ISPA, SAPARD, Turkey instrument, and CARDS. By means of this 
IPA the European Commission has allocated 440 million Euro to support  BiH in its transition 
from the status of a potential candidate country to that of a candidate country for the period 2007-
2011. However, the EU has subsequently reduced this  financial assistance to BiH due to the 
latter’s slow reform process, a move that only served to further pushed the country behind in its 
Europeanisation quest.  
 
The disunity of the European Union position  on Bosnia 
Very often the EU leaders seem very divided and deliver conflicting messages with regard to the 
Bosnian  European integration.  This reflects the fact that the EU itself is divided about Bosnia.  
Among member states, only a handful, most notably the UK, appears to have a clear grasp of the 
dangers posed by Bosnia's current political dynamics" (Tanner, 2011). The EU officials often 
expressed  diverse views and opinions the design and content of the future Bosnian constitutional 
framework .  Bosnian authorities are  referred to not one single model but two - the Copenhagen 
and Madrid formats – demonstrating the relative absence of  an EU common stance. Thus, while 
EU officials have been vocal in their demands and calls for constitutional change, they have not 
been clear enough and committed about the specific requirements expected (Sebastian, 2011: 4). 
This has resulted in a huge EU credibility crisis in Bosnia.  
Indeed, the EU politicians and officials were divided as to whether BiH must accomplish  
constitutional reforms as a condition for its EU membership. For instance, on the one hand the  
European Commission President Barroso pointed out that while constitutional reform was not a 
strict condition for signing the SAA, “there is [a] link between these two processes. . . . The EC 
and EU have to be convinced that they have a partner in BiH, which will be capable to respect its 
promises and implement the Agreement that we negotiate now” (2006). On the hand, Welner 
Almhofer, the Austrian Ambassador to BiH, claimed that the European Union had never set the 
successful implementation of constitutional reforms as a condition for BiH’s EU membership 
(2006).  This gives the impression that the EU authorities have only conceived of  the Bosnian 
constitutional reform as an informal conditionality  with no clear stipulations of rewards or 
punishments (Govedarica, 2010).   
To make matters worse, the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria  are vague and therefore open to 
political manipulation by Bosnian rivals .  The Copenhagen and Madrid criteria can be interpreted 
in a thousand different ways by the  Bosnian elites to serve their political and private interests. 
Thus while  Bosnian Muslims want Bosnia to enter Brussels as a country with a strong and 
powerful central state, the Bosnian Croats would rather support a highly decentralized country, 
and the Bosnian Serbs would want to see Bosnia in the EU as a weak central state but with strong 
entities. This situation was  let to happen because the EU has not set the ultimate standards on 
which all Bosnians could converge and thus avoid an impasse.  
 
The failure of ‘Dayton II’ 
The Dayton-Paris Agreement (DPA) established the Constitution of BiH in an annex of the 
Agreement dividing the country into two political entities: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of BiH 
(mainly controlled by the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats), and the Republika Srpska (RS) mainly 
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governed by the Bosnian Serbs). Both entities have their own political and administrative 
structures. The Federation of BiH is divided into three levels: the Entity level, the Cantonal level, 
and the Municipal level. The RS does not have a cantonal level but municipalities instead. 
Overall, the DPA has succeeded in keeping BiH as an independent and sovereign country with a 
joint multi-ethnic government. Thus, the current political system in Bosnia is a product and result 
of the DPA. Also, one of the most important goals of the DPA –the restoration of security and 
physical infrastructure- has been satisfactorily met.  
However, the broader objective of organizing a multi-ethnic, democratic, and economically 
self-sustaining country has still a long way to go (Daalder and Froman, 1999: 107). While the 
DPA brought the war to an end and laid the foundation for consolidating peace, many observers 
also believe that as a document born of  unique wartime circumstances the DPA cannot by itself 
ensure BiH’s future as a functioning and self-sufficient democratic state (Ashdown, 2005).  
Since domestic politicians could not agree on the necessary changes of the constitution 
external mediation is required. This happened when the EU authorities decided to take decisive 
and concrete diplomatic lead in fixing Dayton and thus paving the way for a new era of 
functional, self-sustaining and democratic BiH. Thus, during the Swedish EU Presidency there 
has been such initiative on the constitutional reform on 10 October and again on 20-21 October, 
when Carl Bildt, Sweden's foreign minister, Olli Rehn, the European commissioner for 
enlargement, and Jim Steinberg, the US deputy secretary of state, called most of Bosnia's political 
party leaders to gather at Butmir, outside Sarajevo, where they outlined a ‘package' of reforms 
deemed necessary for a genuine  Euro-Atlantic integration of their country (Bassuener, 2009). In 
media, the meeting in Butmir was called ‘Dayton II’ to signify its importance for the BiH future 
governance.  
However, it ended in complete failure. Bosnian Serb representatives rejected the proposed 
reforms as too drastic while Bosniak and Croat leaders described them as insufficient to solve the 
long-standing political stalemate. The failure of the  ambiguous and ill-prepared ‘Dayton II’ only  
heightened the current crisis rather than resolving it (Bieber, 2010: 1). 
Although the EU and US seemed united in Butmir  the EU is the most responsible for the   
failure.  This is because the EU does not know how to behave like a global player vis-a-vis what 
is happening in Bosnia. Washington's central policy challenge has shifted from getting the 
Bosnians to cooperate to goading the Europeans to act (Joseph, 2010: 62).  
What is more, the civil society was completely excluded from the Butmir negotiations. This 
was a clear threat to  democratic deliberation, the very value that EU diplomats had hailed as   
European.  Moreover, the Butmir meeting was silence on the controversial practice of ethnic 
voting although the EC had hinted that  ‘entity voting’ has prevented the swift adoption of 
legislation thereby hindering the  country’s rapid progress towards the EU membership (EC, 
2009: 9). All in all the Butmir talks served as a good showcase for the continued relevance of the 
international community but the  status quo remained.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
It is only natural that the  BiH is expected to implement all the necessary economic, political, 
legal and administrative reforms as a part of the country's Europeanization process which already 
began in late 1990s. However, the country's Europeanization process has met with a prolonged  
impasse  due to the  opposing views of the three ethnic groups as to the framework of the 
country's future constitution . In this regard the EU may also be taken as responsible for the 
current status quo since its member states are not united in defining the  standards and measures 
expected of the Bosnian politicians. It seems that European leaders believe that the mere process 
of the integration  will bring stability, prosperity and genuine reconciliation to the country. They 
thus expect the Bosnian political elites to be able make the  necessary reforms including 
constitutional changes that will satisfy all the three ethnic groups although they know that this is 
tantamount to a mission impossible. Although on paper the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria do 
represent  the standards and measures that  Bosnian politicians must reckon with  these do not  
represent the EU’s  common position, a weakness that opportunistic BiH politicians had 
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effectively manipulated  to their advantage. The hesitance, ambivalence and  ambiguity  on the 
part of the EU leadership had thus created  a serious credibility gap for the EU since it could not 
assert and present itself as a convincing and effective trouble shooter for the Bosnian intrigue. 
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